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Vladimir: We have to come back tomorrow.
Estragon: What for?
Vladimir: To wait for Godot.
Estragon: Ah! (Silence) He didn’t come?
Vladimir: No.
Waiting for Godot (Samuel Beckett 1956)
Introduction
In Samuel Beckett’s famous ‘tragicomedy in two acts’, the tragic tramps, 
Vladimir and Estragon, spend a good deal of time waiting for Godot 
and discussing their desire to see him. Godot never arrives, but he 
figures  as potentially present. The absence of Godot is also about his 
presence and, at one level, the entire play can be read as a meditation on 
absence and presence. We only know of Godot’s intimation, and there is 
little by way of actualisation; however, the promise of his presence provides 
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the backdrop against which all other activities occur. In this respect, he 
is a  totalising influence whose presence is everywhere and nowhere—
he exerts an ‘absent presence’.
The absurdity at the centre of this play reminds us that we can think of 
absence and presence as mutually constitutive phenomena rather than 
simple binary opposites, or logical antonyms of each other. Taking ‘absent 
presence’ as our point of departure, this volume focuses on the unstable 
and even dialectical relationship between the presence and the absence 
of the state in the context of natural resource extraction, and the effects 
this creates. This is the first volume that brings together a sustained focus 
on the absent presence of the state in resource extraction settings—
placing this phenomenon at the very centre of analysis. The volume 
also provides a timely contribution to the ethnography of the state and 
state administration, which historically has received comparatively less 
attention in the Oceanic region. It details different experiences of the 
state in extractive settings at a time when we are witnessing increased 
tensions in many countries around the role of the state in managing 
resource extraction and the shift towards a low-carbon future. The state 
duty to protect the rights of citizens is matched by the corporate 
responsibility to respect these human rights (UN 2011). Malfunctioning 
or missing state-systems exacerbate the burdens of extraction on project 
area communities, and increase the likelihood that corporations may 
infringe upon the rights of these communities. This takes place amid local 
demands that governments enact their state responsibilities to protect the 
interests of the people and find more responsible and less destructive ways 
to harness natural resources for the benefit of society. In these contentious 
contexts, the absence of the state, or its particular bureaucratic functions 
and representatives, often creates a heightened sense of the state, with 
the presence of the state felt through its absence—a peculiar and 
paradoxical absent presence that thoroughly shapes the nature of these 
sites of extraction. These experienced absences tend to reinforce particular 
ideas of the state, signalling the interplay between the ideological and the 
material qualities of the state, as we shall discuss below.
The geographical focus of this volume encompasses Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and Australia, with a final chapter that compares PNG 
and Australia with the French territory of New Caledonia—testing and 
demonstrating a wider application of the absent presence concept. PNG 
and Australia are deeply invested in the extraction and exploitation of their 
natural resources, and the extractive industries play an important role in 
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national and regional economies in both. Until 1975, PNG was a colony 
of Australia, administered under a mandate from the United Nations. 
Historically and today, the relationship between these countries can be 
characterised as simultaneously asymmetrical and mutually dependent, 
entangled in a range of political and economic interdependencies, in 
which the industrialised extraction of natural resources plays a significant 
part. In both nations, the state plays a similar role in relation to the 
extractive industries, with responsibility for permitting and regulation, 
and distribution of resource-related benefits, vested in specific government 
agencies. While the Australian state is commonly regarded as ‘mature’ 
and ‘stable’, the state of PNG is more often described as ‘weak’ and 
‘ineffectual’ (Dinnen 2001). The rich ethnographic material presented 
in this volume challenges this simple point of comparison as it applies in 
resource ‘arenas’ (Bainton and Owen 2019), demonstrating that in both 
jurisdictions the state is often perceived to be an absent or incomplete 
institution, producing common and divergent ‘state effects’ (Trouillot 
2001). In both nations, local landowners and custodians of the land have 
similar expectations to benefit from extractive activities taking place on 
their lands, but they also experience comparable forms of depredation and 
dispossession, directly linked to the operation of extractive projects and 
the concurrent presence and absence of the state.
In this introductory chapter, we develop the idea of the absent presence 
of the state. We then sketch some of the main points of commonality 
and difference between PNG and Australia. These form the basis for 
comparison in this volume, including the role of the extractive industries 
in the development of these nation states and their identity; state 
sovereignty over mineral resources; and the experiences and expectations 
of customary landowners. In the final section, we chart the different 
ways in which the state is experienced in these resource settings and the 
various contributions of the authors. An overarching intention of this 
volume is to advance our understanding of the ways in which the state is 
experienced and instantiated through these resource ‘encounters’ (Pijpers 
and Eriksen 2018). As a whole, this volume illustrates how the concept of 
absent presence can be brought to life, enhancing our understanding of 
the state from the vantage point of resource extraction, and thus 
providing a specific contribution to the anthropology of the state and the 
anthropology of extraction.
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Absence, Presence and the Absent 
Presence of the State
How do we study something that is absent or only partially present? 
How  much do we need to know about a specific thing to understand 
the effects of its absence? More specifically, to what extent do we need 
to define the state before it can be studied or before we can even begin to 
comprehend its effects? Beckett tells us almost nothing about Godot, but 
the effect of his absence places him at the centre of the script—and for some 
readers, he is the central character. Conventional wisdom holds that either 
a thing is here or it is not, whereas we more often find that absent things 
leave ‘traces’ of their presence, so that a thing can be present in some ways 
while being absent in others. Philosophers and other scholars have been 
trying to make sense of the idea of absence, and the relationship between 
notions of absence and presence, for a very long time (for example, Sartre 
1957; Kierkegaard 1971 [1843]; Deleuze 1990; Fuery 1995). The work of 
theorists such as Jacques Derrida (1976) has been instrumental in helping 
us to think beyond the simple static binary distinction between absence 
and presence, challenging conventional assumptions about ‘presence’, 
and attacking a particular view that assumes an absolute presence and 
an absolute absence.1 Likewise, anthropologists and sociologists have 
long recognised that social relations are often performed around what is 
there and the presence of what is not (Hetherington 2004). In this regard, 
absence often serves as a kind of ordering device.2 In their work on the 
anthropology of absence, Mikkel Bille and his co-authors emphasise the 
mutual interdependence between the materially present and the materially 
absent, suggesting that the presence or absence of phenomena—persons, 
things, events or places—may not necessarily depend on absolute, positive 
occurrences or the absolute lack thereof, but instead resides in the way 
1  For structuralists, the concept of ‘absent/presence’ denotes the notion of (present) signifiers 
that refer to (absent) signifieds, which is a critical feature of language and representation. These ideas 
were especially important for media and communication theorists because they helped to emphasise 
the ways that ‘representational absence’ can become a form of presence (Bell n.d.). We also come to 
appreciate how certain terms, concepts, factors, questions or issues are rendered ‘conspicuous by their 
absence’, and the symbolic erasure of specific sociocultural groups in text and other mediums or in 
particular social contexts. A focus on absences allows us to grasp the significance of silences and how 
they are actively created, and pay attention to things that have been suppressed or not even allowed 
to exist in the first place.
2  Perhaps the most explicit examples can be drawn from the body of work on mortuary rituals and 
the myriad ways that people attempt to manage absences and the traces that departed kin leave on 
landscapes and the social realm (Hertz 1960 [1907]; Bloch and Parry 1982; Lipset and Silverman 2016).
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that the experience of certain phenomena differs from expectations and 
preconceptions (Bille et al. 2010: 5). As such, we find a paradox in the 
very nature of presence and absence, where their significance is only fully 
realised through their mutuality.
These ideas about the relationship between absence and presence inform 
our approach to the ways that states are encountered through the 
processes of extraction. From this perspective, states can be understood 
as incomplete projects, which reminds us that in many settings the state 
cannot be taken for granted and must be actively reproduced. For example, 
it has been argued that in PNG the state ‘is not something that has been 
around in the past, nor is it expected to be automatically present in 
the future’ (Dalsgaard 2013: 36). In such contexts, the presence of the 
state is uncertain and incomplete. The state must be made present, and 
conceptualisation of state presence cannot be separated from its absence 
(ibid.).3 By focusing on the absent presence of the state in resource 
extraction settings, we come to see the incompleteness and uncertainty 
that constitutes the contemporary capitalist state—as the contributors to 
this volume show, from the vantage point of resource extraction projects, 
states appear very partial. This helps us to think about the proximity of 
people and processes in relation to these projects and the state, and the 
spatial and temporal dimensions that shape these encounters. The notion 
of absent presence also enables us to move beyond ideas about the total 
absence or total presence of the state and, instead, grasp the ways that 
things, like states, can be simultaneously present and absent. In this 
respect, our approach provides a critical counterpoint to the simplistic 
‘big-picture’ framework of the state developed by Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson (2020) in their popular political science work The Narrow 
Corridor. According to their model, states (which they prefer to call 
‘Leviathans’) can be charted on an evolutionary scale comprising ‘absent’, 
‘despotic’ and ‘shackled’ Leviathans, the latter representing the balance 
between the power of the state and society’s capacity to control it. Their 
primary purpose is to demonstrate the range of factors that influence the 
trajectory of different states and how societies have failed or managed to 
achieve ‘liberty’. But for our purposes, their model locks us into the idea 
3  In his more recent work Dalsgaard describes how the government as a facet of the state in Melanesia 
‘has become locally adopted and institutionalised in multiple and sometimes contrasting ways that speak 
to both the varied colonial history and the cultural diversity of the region’ (2019: 255).
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of categorical absence, which leaves very little room for thinking about 
how states may be absent in some ways and present in others, at different 
moments in time, and for different sections of society.
In thinking about the relative absence or presence of the state in the 
processes of extraction, it is useful to consider the material and non-
material dimensions of the state. Philip Abrams (1988) has suggested 
that we should distinguish between the ‘state-system’ and the ‘state-idea’. 
The former refers to the palpable nexus of institutional arrangements and 
apparatuses centred in government, while the latter refers to the reification 
of this system as a substantial and totalising entity, or a thing, that is 
separate from society. Thus, if we think of the state as both a material force 
and an ideological power—as twin aspects of the same process—then it 
follows that we should also attend to the senses in which the state does 
not exist, as well as those in which it does, and the relationship between 
them. In other words, how the everyday materiality of the state, through 
its routines, rituals, representatives, activities and policies, constitutes 
and regulates modern subjects and shapes how people come to believe 
in the idea of the state and how this in turn effects everyday practice. 
Several contributors to this volume locate the absent presence of the state 
precisely in the localised interplay between state-systems and the state-
idea—the way in which the state is imagined, anticipated and experienced 
in extractive contexts.
A decade after Abrams laid out his formula for comprehending the 
contemporary capitalist state, Michel-Rolph Trouillot made a similar 
argument. He observed that in different times and places the power of 
the state can seem more or less evident and encroaching. This observation 
is echoed in a number of chapters in this volume that reflect on spatial 
as well as temporal dimensions of the state: the sense of distance between 
the state, resource projects and impacted communities, and changing 
experiences of state presence at different points in time throughout the 
project life cycle. Trouillot reasoned that ethnographic analysis of the 
state must recognise that state power has ‘no institutional fixity’, and 
that ‘state effects never obtain solely through national institutions or in 
governmental sites’ (Trouillot 2001: 126). These two features, he said, are 
inherent in the capitalist state, and have been exacerbated by globalising 
processes. If the state is not limited in terms of institutions or geography, 
then its presence becomes somewhat more deceptive, and there is a ‘need 
to theorise the state beyond the empirically obvious’. Trouillot’s suggested 
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strategy was to ‘focus on the multiple sites in which state processes are 
recognisable through their effects’. That is, if the state is not reducible to 
government or a set of apparatuses, and instead can be understood as an 
enlarged set of practices and processes and their effects, then we need to 
pay attention to these practices and processes and the effects they produce 
(ibid.: 131).
Trouillot identified four state effects, which we regularly encounter in 
resource extraction settings. First, as James Scott once observed, state 
power relies on legibility: an illegible society is a hindrance to effective 
interference by the state (1998: 78). Many anthropologists have observed 
these legibility effects, where local communities attempt to make 
themselves legible to companies or the state in order to be recognised as 
project beneficiaries. State actors or representatives are also engaged in 
the project of enhancing the legibility of local communities or assigning 
identities to individual subjects. In the same way, companies engage in 
processes of ‘simplification’ as part of the ongoing, and always incomplete, 
project of legibility. Second, we also witness the so-called ‘isolation 
effect’ as community members are converted into atomised individual 
subjects, achieved by means of company-supplied identification numbers 
for its local  workers or through company-sponsored census lists, the 
identification of ‘project stakeholders’, and so on. Third, the delineation of 
customary landowners and traditional owners who are beneficiaries 
of these projects resembles the ‘identification effect’, which leads to 
Trouillot’s fourth and final state effect—‘spatialisation’, or the creation and 
maintenance of jurisdictions and boundaries. As governments establish 
lease areas and ‘zones of entitlement’ for resource extraction projects, 
this creates new forms of governance within and across these boundaries. 
We  see an equivalence between this final effect and Peter Vandergeest 
and Nancy Lee Peluso’s concept of ‘territorialization’ (1995). Such spatial 
strategies bring the state into being by controlling people and access 
to natural resources. In regards to resource extraction, territorialisation 
entails: ‘the creation and mapping of land boundaries, the allocation of 
land rights to so-called private actors, and the designation of specific 
resource (including land) uses by both state and “private” actors according 
to territorial criteria’ (ibid.: 415). But as the contributors to this collection 
show, territorialisation is often unstable or uncertain, and the people 
most affected by the state’s resource territorialisation often undermine, 
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disrupt or resist the state’s goals and private actor interests—processes 
which can understood as a type of ‘double movement’ in property rights 
(Filer et al. 2020).
The contributions to this volume add several other state effects to this list, 
including ‘order effects’, ‘enactment effects’, ‘responsibilisation effects’ and 
‘material effects’, where companies provide the services and infrastructure 
that states ordinarily provide to legitimise themselves. They also illustrate 
a ‘corporate’ or ‘contractual’ effect where neoliberal states are increasingly 
run like (poorly managed) companies, while multinational corporations 
and multilateral institutions (like the World Bank or the United Nations) 
can assume more state-like powers in resource extraction contexts and 
produce various state effects. This resembles Christian Lund’s observations 
on the ‘state-quality’ of non-state institutions, where private actors ‘strut 
in borrowed plumes’ (2006: 677). As resource companies use the language 
of the state and its props—including deeds and contracts, stationery and 
stamps—this challenges the idea that states have a singular hold on the 
exercise of power and authority, and in some cases blurs the lines between 
‘state effects’ and ‘company effects’, which often demonstrate themselves 
in terms of simplification, spatialisation, isolation and identification. 
When extractive companies use these strategies to assert exclusive claims 
over lease land areas, this also serves to uphold or reinforce the internal 
territorial strategies of the state. We might then ask whether these private 
sector actions constitute ‘state effects’ that demonstrate the presence of 
the state, or whether they are better conceptualised as ‘company effects’ 
that bear the hallmark of state authority but confirm private interests 
according to territorial criteria and signal the absence of the state.
All of this allows us to think about the state, or to recognise the presence 
and the influence or the effects of the state, precisely in those places 
that appear peripheral—like remote resource extraction enclaves in 
Australia and PNG.
Two States and their Resource Journeys
In most respects, PNG and Australia are profoundly different. Australia 
can be classified as a developed settler nation whose ‘development’ was 
based on the dispossession of its Indigenous population, and it is the 
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dominant political and economic nation state in the Pacific region.4 PNG 
is a relatively young nation. Its Indigenous population has acquired control 
of state institutions, and retained ownership and control of their land 
and resources, but the majority of the population live comparatively less 
developed rural lives. The country remains heavily reliant upon Australian 
aid and it is often described by outside commentators as a ‘struggling’ or 
‘developing’ nation state that exerts limited influence beyond its shores. 
While the differences are significant, and we could easily expand this list, 
the two nation states have at least one major thing in common beyond 
their shared colonial history: an extraordinary commitment to resource-
driven economic development, underpinned by favourable geological 
factors and an abundance of mineral resources in their territories. In both 
countries the government has strenuously advocated for extractive 
capitalism, or what the captains of these industries prefer to call ‘resource 
development’.
Large-scale resource extraction looms large in PNG and Australia and 
both countries can be described as ‘resource-dependent nations’. Resource 
extraction has had a profound effect on their enmeshed histories and 
continues to be an important part of their national identities. Mining 
activities shadowed the birth of these two nation states and provided the 
economic base to support a transition away from their respective colonial 
masters—although in the case of PNG, resource extraction has provided 
Australia with new pathways to exert power over this sovereign nation. The 
expansion of the resources sector in PNG provides important economic 
opportunities for many of its citizens and is a primary source of revenue 
for the state, as well as thousands of Australian businesses and skilled 
workers who capitalise on these opportunities. Despite these asymmetries, 
their economies are mutually entwined in a history of extractive 
ventures—through investments, trade and business opportunities, and 
employment—and for the foreseeable future the extractive industries 
will dominate the economic, political and physical landscape across these 
two countries.
4  Although in recent years the influence and authority of Australia across the Pacific region 
has been challenged by the growing presence of China. See, for example, Crocombe (2007) and 
McDougall (2019).
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Figure 1.1 Map of Australia and Papua New Guinea with resource 
extraction projects and sites noted in this volume
Source: ANU Cartography
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Australia
The extraction of mineral resources has long been part of the culture and 
development of Australia, and it has shaped the country as we now know 
it. It could be said that the first mining phase began some 60,000 years 
ago, with the first Aboriginal Australians who utilised resources of the 
earth for cultural and technological reasons and various forms of trade. 
Following European invasion in 1788, coal was soon being extracted to 
provide fuel for heating and cooking, and later steam locomotion. The first 
gold rush began in earnest in 1851 in the state of New South Wales 
and within three months had spread to the state of Victoria (Macintyre 
2009: 87). These rushes quickly transformed the Australian colonies and 
fuelled the dynamic growth of towns and cities. Within just two years 
the number of free migrants arriving in Australia was greater than the 
number of convicts who had arrived in the past 70 years (ibid.). Many 
of these hopeful migrants, known as ‘diggers’, brought new skills and 
professions, and contributed to a burgeoning economy. The population 
boomed and Australia became a ‘multicultural’ society, of sorts. Migrants 
of non-European descent, especially Chinese immigrants who were 
particularly industrious on the goldfields, were unwelcome, signalling the 
xenophobic tensions that would continue to shape Australian society.5 It is 
often claimed that the ‘mateship’ that developed between these diggers 
(of predominantly European descent) and their collective resistance to 
authority laid the foundation for a unified and unique national identity 
independent of British colonial rule.6 In short, the early gold rushes 
transformed the colonies and helped precipitate settler Australia into 
nationhood.
The young colonies were quick to begin exporting minerals. During 
the 1850s, Victoria contributed more than one third of the world’s gold 
output, and by the 1860s exports of copper and lead earned more than 
exports from wool and wheat. Following Federation in 1901, the role of 
mining in the economic development of Australia gradually increased. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, lead, zinc and copper deposits 
5  The presence of thousands of Chinese immigrants, many of whom existed under forms of labour 
bondage, gave birth to the early expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment and the nation’s first race-based 
migration restrictions, which later coalesced in the White Australia policy.
6  In 1854, 1,000 diggers assembled at Eureka in Victoria to protest against the imposition 
of mining licence fees. The Eureka rebellion has since become a favourite event in the national 
mythology of Australia.
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were discovered in Queensland at Mt Isa, although their full potential 
was not realised until the 1950s. In the 1960s, following the Australian 
government’s changes to the restrictions on iron ore exports, exploration 
commenced across the Pilbara region in Western Australia leading to the 
development of numerous large-scale mining operations. By the end of 
the twentieth century, Australia was one of the world’s leading resource 
nations, processing and exporting huge amounts of iron ore and coal, 
and other valued minerals. In the early years of the twenty-first century, 
the industry continued to grow in size and significance. The post-2001 
resources boom was unprecedented in its scope, scale and economic 
significance (Cleary 2011). By 2014 mining contributed almost 
60 per cent of Australia’s exports as resource companies scaled up their 
investments and their operations. What counted as a mega mine in the 
1980s was just a ‘normal’ mine by the 2010s, and resource towns were 
flush with prosperity and opportunity. But, as Thomas Hyland Eriksen 
observed in his ethnography of a Queensland ‘boomtown’, the downside 
of such accelerated change is the rise of ‘treadmill capitalism’ where growth 
is placed ahead of other considerations (like sustainability), constant 
change is necessary in order to stay in the same place within the system, 
and, more importantly, where uncontrolled ‘runaway processes’ preclude 
political or popular governance of the system (Eriksen 2018: 104).
In recent years, the petroleum industries, comprising the extraction 
and processing of oil and gas, have played an equally important role in 
Australia. The first oil well was drilled in Western Australia in 1907, but 
the industry was not developed in a major way until the 1970s when 
massive gas and condensate discoveries (light crude oil) were made off the 
northwest coast of Western Australia. Over the last decade the Australian 
natural gas industry has grown rapidly, as part of ‘global gas revolution’. 
Converted into liquefied natural gas (LNG), this new resource capacity 
primarily supplies international energy markets. In  order to meet 
this demand, unconventional coal seam gas reserves have been rapidly 
developed, especially in the eastern states of Queensland and New South 
Wales, which has included controversial extraction techniques such as 
hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’ as it is commonly known (de Rijke 
2018). Fracking introduced new types of extractive infrastructure into the 
industrial landscape thus far dominated by large-scale projects typically 
centralised in single locations. Given that this gas is not located in easily 
accessible reservoirs, this usually results in numerous wells being drilled 
over large areas. Along with all of the other infrastructure that is required 
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to transport and process coal seam gas—including gathering lines, 
compressor stations, well pad access tracks, and LNG processing and 
export plants—this means that the collective footprint of this industry is 
much larger and more reticular compared to other extractive industries, 
such as mining, which generally produces enclave spaces.
Papua New Guinea
PNG’s resource journey has been somewhat similar to Australia’s. 
Like  Aboriginal people in Australia, Papua New Guineans had been 
extracting and utilising mineral resources for ceremonial and practical 
purposes for thousands of years. In the 1800s, the scale of extraction 
increased with European presence. When Captain John Moresby 
surveyed the southern coast of New Guinea in the early 1870s, he judged 
it was highly likely that the country contained an abundance of mineral 
resources. It was only a matter of years before a gold rush began, setting 
the future nation of PNG on a course towards resource dependency. 
By 1884 Britain had established a protectorate over the southeast portion 
of the country, which it called British New Guinea, but was later known 
as Papua, while the Germans claimed the northeast portion, which they 
called German New Guinea. Some 400 white miners had made their 
way from Port Moresby and north Australia to Sudest Island off the 
southern tip of Papua where gold was discovered in 1888, and then on to 
Misima Island in 1889 (Nelson 1976). In 1926 gold was found at Edie 
Creek in Morobe Province on the mainland, which led to the first major 
investment in the development of alluvial gold mining operations around 
Wau-Bululo in the 1930s (Waterhouse 2010).
The territories of Papua and New Guinea were combined under a single 
administration (or mandate) after the Second World War. In the 
following decades, the Australian administration came to the conclusion 
that the decolonisation of the territories could certainly be managed or 
even delayed, but definitely not prevented. Mindful that the future nation 
would need a stable economic base to support its independence, the 
administration set about mapping the natural resources of the country. 
In 1964 copper and gold deposits were discovered at Panguna on the 
island of Bougainville, and by 1967 an agreement to develop a  mine 
had been reached and enacted by the House of Assembly. The mine was 
fully operational in 1972, just in time to help fund the territories’ 
transition to independence in 1975, but not without some last-minute 
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concessions to avert Bougainville’s secession from the nation (Denoon 
2000). The Panguna mine was operated by Bougainville Copper Limited 
Pty  Ltd, which was a subsidiary of Conzinc Riotinto of Australia. 
The mine mobilised the largest investment in any Australian territory at 
the time and was therefore pivotal to the decolonisation process.
The new independent state set about growing the economy and over the 
following decades several large-scale gold and copper mining operations 
were established for this purpose. The giant Ok Tedi mine was opened 
on the opposite side of the country in 1984, followed by the Misima 
gold mine in 1989, the Porgera gold mine in 1991, the Lihir gold mine 
in 1997, and later the Ramu nickel mine in 2012, along with various 
smaller operations. The growth of this sector played out against the 
backdrop of the crisis that was unfolding back on Bougainville where 
the social and environmental impacts of the Panguna mine sparked 
a full-scale civil war in 1989, which forced the closure of the mine and 
ultimately cost some 20,000  lives (Regan 2017). Panguna represents 
a very special case of state presence and abandonment. The loss of revenue 
from Panguna increased the urgency and necessity to open new mines to 
make up for the shortfall—and rather than reassess the role of resource 
extraction, the state renewed its commitment to extractive capitalism. 
For example, the closure of Panguna led to a series of decisions regarding 
Ok Tedi’s continued operations, ultimately triggering what Stuart Kirsch 
(2014: 133) described as ‘a slow motion environmental disaster’ as a result 
of riverine tailings disposal.7
As in Australia, while mineral extraction continues to play an important 
role in the extractive sector in PNG, the petroleum industry is growing 
in scale and influence, having established itself in PNG shortly after it 
had developed in Australia, with the first oil exports from the Southern 
Highlands occurring in 1992. The most significant development to date 
has been the massive PNG LNG project that pipes gas extracted from 
Hela Province in the highlands down to the huge processing facilities on 
the outskirts of Port Moresby, where it is then shipped to international 
markets (see Main, Chapter 5, this volume).
7  At other mines, like Misima and Lihir, deep sea tailings placement, or DSTP, has been regarded 
as an alternative, because tailings dams are vulnerable to earthquakes. Both riverine disposal and deep 
sea tailings placement practices are banned in Australia, but tailings dams are favoured because the 
country is much less prone to earthquakes.
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Regimes of Resource Ownership
Looking at legal and policy frameworks in PNG and Australia, it would 
appear that Papua New Guineans are better placed to benefit from 
resource extraction than their Aboriginal Australian counterparts. This 
conventional wisdom is mostly based upon the differences between the 
legal regimes that operate in these countries in relation the customary 
ownership of land. In both countries, sovereignty over all minerals is 
vested in the state. In Australia landowners are the owners of the surface 
of the land and have no automatic right to the minerals that may be found 
underneath the surface.8 While surface minerals are not mentioned in 
Australian legislation, in PNG customary landowners have an automatic 
legal right to harvest minerals on the surface of the land or in streams 
and rivers and many communities, including near large-scale resource 
extraction projects, engage in alluvial gold mining activities (Bainton et al. 
2020).9 In PNG the state grants leases to private companies to extract and 
develop these mineral resources, whereas in Australia this responsibility sits 
with the relevant subnational territories and state governments. In both 
jurisdictions access agreements must be negotiated with landowners, and 
compensation paid for disturbances. The major point of difference can 
be found in the legal recognition of customary interests in the land and 
the right to benefit from resource extraction. In PNG customary land 
rights are enshrined in the Constitution, which means that under the 
terms of the Oil and Gas Act 1998 and the Mining Act 1992, the primary 
legislation governing resource extraction, customary landowners have 
a more direct stake in the development of any resources located within 
their ancestral territories. Resource companies are required to compensate 
the landowners for disturbance or damage to their land. They are also 
required to enter into benefit-sharing negotiations with landowner 
communities, and these communities can then expect to receive a range 
8  In Australia, petroleum and mineral resources are generally the property of the Crown. There 
was a time when the common law position stated that the minerals belonged to the landowner, and 
that the minerals were regarded as an inherent product of the land itself. Common law assumed that 
whoever owned the land also owed the soil below and the space above the surface. The qualification 
was the right of the Crown to extract gold and silver, characterised as ‘royal minerals’. This common 
law position was circumscribed with the passing of specific legislation that vested the ownership of 
minerals contained within the soil of private landholdings in the Crown (Hepburn 2011).
9  Section 9(2) of the Mining Act 1992 says that: ‘Any natural person who is a citizen may carry out 
non-mechanized mining of alluvial minerals on land owned by that natural person, provided that the 
mining is carried out safely and in accordance with the Mining (Safety) Act 1977 and that the land is 
not the subject of a tenement (other than an exploration licence).’
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
16
of benefits from these projects (Filer 2012; Bainton and Jackson 2020). 
This is not to dismiss the tensions which arise between different groups 
with competing claims to the same areas of land, or the problems 
associated with ‘mobilising’ customary land for development (Filer 2019). 
However, the legal recognition of customary land rights in PNG shifts the 
question from recognition of those rights, to identifying specific groups in 
possession of those rights and the subsequent capture of benefits.
In the Australian context, the Native Title Act 1993 dictates that 
Aboriginal people must prove a connection to their ancestral lands in 
order to exercise their interests, which is a rather difficult task for many 
groups given the onerous legal hurdles associated with native title (Weiner 
and Glaskin 2007; Glaskin 2017). This situation is compounded by 
the history of Aboriginal dispossession, including the founding fiction 
of terra nullius, which essentially held that the continent was ‘no man’s 
land’, and the fact that so many groups were forcibly removed from their 
land to reserves and missions. Other groups were massacred en masse in 
the frontier wars, which makes it doubly difficult for their descendants 
to demonstrate lines of ancestral continuity. As Sarah Holcombe and 
Gareth Lewis discuss in their chapters for this volume, this early history 
of violence and dispossession set the tone for the relationship between 
Aboriginal communities, resource companies and the Australian state, 
and continues to impact the ways that some Aboriginal groups in Australia 
relate to the state both as an idea and as a system. Aboriginal groups who 
are granted recognition of their traditional ownership of specific areas are 
entitled to the right to negotiate with any entities seeking to develop the 
minerals resources on their land, but it doesn’t grant them veto rights. 
The exception to this rule can be found in the earlier Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act 1976, which grants veto rights to owners of ‘Aboriginal Land’ 
in the Northern Territory. Similar to PNG, in some cases this can result 
in  negotiated agreements for the provision of specific benefits and 
payments (O’Faircheallaigh 2016).
The question of ownership extends beyond land and resources. Following 
global neoliberal trends, the Australian government has steadily reduced 
its stock of state-owned enterprises, which are sometimes termed 
‘government business enterprises’. While the government has retained 
ownership of various energy and infrastructure companies, there are no 
state-owned extractive companies operating in Australia. In PNG, the 
processes of privatisation have been less extensive. The state has maintained 
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ownership of companies providing essential services and established several 
enterprises to consolidate and manage its interests in the business of hard 
rock mining and petroleum development.10 Among other things, this has 
enabled the state to become a major partner in the PNG LNG project, 
and to assume ownership of the Ok Tedi and Tolukuma mines. However, 
the acquisition of these mines took place in rather special circumstances 
and should not be confused with the government’s statutory right to 
acquire a minority stake in joint ventures with foreign investors. While 
the latter may sometimes appear to outside observers as a ‘commitment to 
nationalisation’, it is better interpreted as a commitment to an option for 
‘participation’. The growing public and political discourse about the need 
to actually nationalise the resource sector is partly influenced by ideas 
about resource dependency that were prominent in the early independence 
period (Amarshi et al. 1979), and continuing concerns about the ways 
that powerful foreign states and companies maintain their economic 
and political advantage by exploiting the raw materials of less developed 
countries. There is a popular expectation (in some quarters at least) that 
the state should acquire ownership of all resource projects so that PNG 
can reverse these trends and reap a greater share of the financial benefits 
derived from the exploitation of its natural resources. But this pathway 
to development also entails a fundamental conflict of interest as the state 
becomes both a shareholder and a regulator of these projects. In the case 
of the Ok Tedi Mine, the state made regulatory decisions that sought 
to minimise operational expenditures and maximise economic returns as 
both a shareholder and a tax collector. Many of these decisions were made 
at the expense of people living downstream from the mine. This kind of 
situation emphasises the very selective presence of the state and embeds 
the state in a web of conflicting interests. This includes conflicts emerging 
from the state’s dual role as a regulator and an investor, and extends to 
internal conflicts between different state functions and institutions.
10  In 1975 the Mineral Resources Development Company (MRDC) was established as a 100 per 
cent state-owned company. Originally established to acquire and manage state and landowner interests 
in mining and petroleum projects, including management of equity funds for landowner companies, 
in 2007 the state’s equity interests were then transferred to Petromin Holdings Limited, and the focus 
of MRDC was limited to landowner interests. In 2015, the government passed the Kumul Minerals 
Act, consolidating the state’s oil, gas and mining interests, and Petromin was restructured into two 
companies—Kumul Mineral Holdings Limited and Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited.
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Resource Development
While both countries can be considered resource-rich nations, PNG 
is often described as suffering from the so-called ‘resource curse’ or 
the ‘paradox of plenty’, which generally holds that countries with an 
abundance of natural resources tend to experience less economic growth 
and worse development outcomes (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017).11 This 
term is less often used to describe the Australian experience of extractive-
led development, although some commentators would certainly not 
agree that Australia has avoided the resource curse (i.e. Cleary 2011). 
In PNG, the curse is often thought to be linked to faulty and ineffective 
governance, or ‘maladministration’ (Burton 1998), where the state is 
unable to curb the excesses of the extractive industries or convert natural 
resources into sustainable forms of development. Anthropologists and 
other social scientists working in the country who have written about the 
‘resource curse’ have generally focused on the ways in which it is manifest 
through increased social conflicts and environmental impacts and the 
forms of structural violence that are created and intensified by large-scale 
resource extraction projects (see Filer 1990; Haley and May 2007; Banks 
2008; Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017; Allen 2018). In Australia, on the 
other hand, analytical focus is usually directed at the macro-scale, which 
might go some way towards explaining why the country is not generally 
thought to be afflicted by this curse. But when we shift our focus to the 
local scale, especially to the Indigenous estate, the picture begins to look 
rather different and in many cases pre-existing forms of discrimination 
and structurally unjust forms of political economy have been exacerbated 
by resource extraction (Langton and Mazel 2008; Altman and Martin 
2009). It now becomes clear that the negative force of the resource curse 
should not be understood as a purely economic issue, but it can ‘also be 
portrayed in political, cultural, or environmental terms, which means that 
the resource curse may have several dimensions in the same country or 
region’ (Filer and Macintyre 2006: 217).
The presence of the resource curse can be reconceptualised in terms of the 
absence of development that resource extraction promises to deliver—yet 
another demonstration of the absent presence of the state. Continuing 
with the metaphor of Godot is apposite, as some communities have 
11  The concept of the resource curse was first elaborated by British economist Richard Auty (1993). 
See also Karl (1997) and Ross (2003). See also Ross’ (2015) examination of a relationship between 
‘resource curse’ and state governance.
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maintained their enthusiasm for extractive-led development despite the 
known impacts of extraction and the fact that the anticipated benefits, 
or the government and the developers, have simply never arrived. Many 
of these communities find themselves anxiously ‘waiting for company’ 
(Dwyer and Minnegal 1998). Several authors in this volume describe 
situations where communities are waiting for certain forms of development, 
which, like Godot, ultimately remain unknown and uncertain. In both 
national settings this absence can be partly understood as result of the 
failure of the state to bring ‘development’ (economic opportunities and 
services) to many rural areas. In the Australian context this reflects the 
extent to which most Aboriginal people have been marginalised from 
the mainstream economy and the opportunities enjoyed by the majority 
of the population and the desire for self-determination (and the ways 
in which resource extraction is imagined as a possible pathway to such 
ends). In PNG this enthusiasm is expressed through a particular set of 
beliefs, which Colin Filer has called ‘the ideology of landownership’. This 
ideology generally holds that the road to development can be found in 
the compensation and benefits that are provided by resource companies 
to customary landowners in return for the extraction of the natural 
resources located within their ancestral lands (Filer 1997). Of course, 
commitment to this ideology does not mean that people are not wary of 
the impacts of extraction, but it does highlight a particular expression of 
local sovereignty and understanding of development. In both settings the 
prospect of resource extraction has generated strong contestation between 
groups who want these activities to proceed in the hope that this will 
improve their circumstances and enhance their autonomy, and those who 
remain unconvinced by the ‘value proposition’ of extractive capitalism.
In Australia this resistance is often connected to the broader Aboriginal 
land rights movement, but it also finds expression among a coalition of 
environmental activists and pastoralists in, for example, the ‘Lock the 
Gate Alliance’ that seeks to prevent further fracking operations (de Rijke 
2013; and Espig, Chapter 6, this volume). Enthusiasm and resistance 
at the local level are also mirrored at the national level. Back in 2017 
when he was still the Treasurer of Australia, Scott Morrison, who is now 
the country’s prime minister, brought a lump of coal into the House of 
Representatives as a political stunt to indicate the government’s support 
for the coal industry, coal-fired power stations and a carbon-intensive 
economy (Murphy 2017). Morrison’s support for the extractive industries 
reached new heights in 2019 when he signalled his intent to clamp 
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down on individuals and organisations that protest against the impacts 
of extraction.12 The  government’s position has generated much unrest, 
and in the wake of the 2019 and 2020 mega fires across large parts of 
Australia, there have been increased calls to stop all new coal mining 
developments to help prevent further overheating of the globe. The sense 
of the failure of the state to respond to the emergency caused by the fires 
was made worse by the prime minister’s initial absence, and then his 
widely debated ‘inappropriate’ and ‘inadequate’ presence in the affected 
areas (Brett 2020). While the current conservative government in Australia 
wants to remove the barriers to expand global extractive investment in 
Australia, and has proposed a ‘gas-fired recovery’ to lift Australia out 
its COVID-19 induced economic recession, the PNG government 
has sent a more nationalistic message about containing mineral wealth 
within the country. In his 2019 ‘manifesto’ to the nation, the current 
prime minister of PNG, James Marape, pledged that he would ‘take back 
PNG’ and turn the country into the ‘richest black Christian nation on 
earth’. While these political slogans encapsulated a very broad agenda for 
reform (and represent a direct response to past government failings), his 
manifesto contained specific commitments to ensure that Papua New 
Guineans will obtain a much larger share of the benefits arising from 
exploitation of the nation’s natural resources, positioning extraction at 
the forefront of the future prosperity of the nation. These sentiments are 
best encapsulated in the tagline used by the government regulator of the 
industry, the Mineral Resources Authority: ‘minerals for life’. However, in 
the event, the reality of extractive capitalism frequently belies the promises 
of ‘resource development’. At this point, the experiences of customary 
landowners in PNG begin to converge with the experiences of traditional 
owners in Australia.
Implicating the State in the Extraction 
of Resources
The state is often perceived by different groups as habitually failing to be 
present in meaningful ways in resource extraction contexts. Of course, it 
can also be argued that this failure has occurred in many ‘remote’ areas 
12  In a press release titled ‘Australian mining: Building a better future’, the Minerals Council 
of  Australia (the peak representative body of the Australian mining industry) welcomed this 
political support (MCA 2019).
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where resource projects are not present. And, in the PNG context, the 
state’s absence is just as marked in areas where logging companies or palm 
oil companies have large-scale operations as it is in areas where mining 
or petroleum companies operate (e.g. Tammisto 2016). Nevertheless, in 
many cases, including a number of examples presented in this volume, the 
state is perceived as being more present for some groups and less present 
for others, raising questions about the state’s complex and multifaceted 
obligations towards local communities, foreign investors and broadly 
conceived goals of national development. In both PNG and Australia 
it is common to hear complaints from different quarters that the state 
has abandoned its responsibilities in relation to resource extraction; 
overlooked or overridden its primary duties to its citizens; forgotten that 
some portions of the population even exist; left corporate entities and 
local communities to their own devices; that it is working against the 
growth of the resources sector and blocking industrial progress or, on the 
other hand, that it is too closely aligned with the interests of multinational 
capital, or has outsourced its responsibilities to the private sector, and 
so on.
Rather than trying to unpack all these conflicting expectations and 
critiques, it is useful to first consider what is significant and unique 
about resource extraction and how the state is implicated, experienced 
and brought into being through these activities. Several structural features 
of resource extraction are important in this regard. First of all, states 
reinforce the primacy of their sovereign authority through their exclusive 
claim over the mineral resources in the land. The state’s supreme authority 
is symbolically upheld through formal legislative frameworks that govern 
the ownership and extraction of these resources. States open up land to 
facilitate development, and in some contexts, where states are struggling 
under macroeconomic constraints, the revenues generated by resource 
extraction allow states to continue functioning as states. Perversely, in 
countries like PNG, economic dependence upon extraction, inaction and 
limited capacity also weaken the ability of the state to exercise its sovereign 
power, contributing to the experience of a ‘resource curse’. Similar charges 
have been made against the Australian state, which remains heavily 
dependent on mineral exports and has been captured by the interests of the 
industry at all jurisdictional levels. Second, large-scale resource extraction 
generates profound transformations. It extends capitalist development 
into places where the capitalist economy is not institutionalised or places 
where it is characterised by petty commodity production or agrarian 
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capitalism, such as the development of large-scale mines in frontier zones 
in PNG. In these instances, it introduces a  form of capitalism that is 
characterised by accumulation on a large scale combined with significant 
forms of dispossession and disruption. It is not uncommon for conflicts 
between local and national interests to play out in those arenas, and for 
national political leaders to invoke the ‘greater national good’ to justify 
locally experienced impacts of extraction and the creation of ‘sacrifice 
zones’. Third, large-scale resource extraction also changes the dynamics of 
existing capitalist arrangements by introducing new forms of capitalism 
into areas that are already incorporated into the global capitalist economy, 
such as the development of coal seam gas operations in the pastoral regions 
of Australia. It ultimately affects the geography of capitalist development 
and accumulation in ways that are related to the nature and geography 
of natural resources, and the geography of prior political and economic 
arrangements. And as we discuss below, these structural features point to 
a temporal dimension as the state’s presence or absence alternates through 
different phases of the resource project cycle. As the authors in this volume 
show, presence often turns to absence once approvals and licences have 
been granted.
The rapid and unruly socioeconomic change generated by these projects 
constitute forms of immanent development in the sense conveyed 
by Cowen and Shenton (1996). Under these conditions, there is 
a  heightened need for state-systems to manage or offset the effects of 
these transformations—and it is here that we frequently encounter the 
absence of the state. Indeed, local communities often demand an increase 
in the presence of the state and regard resource extraction as a way of 
securing state services, including law and order, health and education 
services, and public infrastructure. But in lieu of a more active role, states 
have tended to delegate greater regulatory responsibility and discretion 
to resource companies—which may constitute a form of ‘indirect rule’, 
where the state is anchored in project locations through the delegation 
of its functions to extractive corporations.
Large-scale resource extraction is also implicated in a range of intentional 
interventions that are geared towards particular ends. These interventions 
are mainly directed towards the management or governance of people, 
policies, landscapes and resources in ways that secure resource investments 
and extend extractive capitalism, as well as other sociopolitical projects. 
Some of these interventions are designed to secure local support for these 
ventures, which can take the form of community development programs 
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and investment in other forms of ‘intentional development’ that are 
designed to mitigate the immanent processes associated with resource 
extraction (Banks et al. 2017). Here we begin to see a convergence 
of interest between states and private companies, both in terms of 
function (as companies assume state responsibilities) and style (creeping 
bureaucratisation and managerialism). In this respect, extractive companies 
are involved in a form of ‘trusteeship’ that is more typically associated with 
the state (Cowan and Shenton 1996). By assuming some responsibilities 
for the local population, resource companies also play a role in defining 
aspects of a desirable future for that population. More importantly, 
evidence from both countries suggests that resource companies invest 
considerable energy and resources into steering populations towards 
that future, framing it in terms of ‘progress’ and enhanced personal and 
communal opportunities.
States also seek specific goals through resource extraction. In most 
jurisdictions, including PNG and Australia, the state holds sovereignty 
over mineral resources and notionally claims that these resources will be 
used for the collective benefit of the population. It is important to recall 
that states are not passive custodians of the common wealth. They may 
intervene through policies and legislation that enable the expansion of 
extractive capitalism within their national territory, or they may seek to 
constrain extractive activities in certain areas, such as conservation zones. 
The state issues permits to companies to develop these resources, and it is 
expected to perform a regulatory function to ensure that these activities 
occur within prescribed parameters. The state may be a direct financier or 
shareholder in some resource operations, meaning that in addition to its 
regulatory role it has a direct stake in the commercial success of individual 
ventures (which can constitute a contradictory role). And in many 
instances the state—through the relevant branches of government—will 
enter into various agreements with the parties to these projects and make 
specific commitments as part of the overall compensation and benefits 
sharing process.
There can also be an inter-state dimension to resource extraction, both 
in terms of international trade in resources, and attracting and managing 
foreign direct investment, as well as using extraction and trade in 
resources to achieve economic and political aims in international arenas 
as well as domestically. For example, the complete absence of the PNG 
state at the Ramu nickel mine in PNG has opened up a space for the 
Chinese state (as the owner of the company developing this resource) 
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to exercise forms of ‘soft power’ within this sovereign state as part of 
its (somewhat unsuccessful) attempt to retrofit this project into its Belt 
and Road Initiative (Smith 2018). Although states pursue a range of 
political and economic goals through resource extraction, these may not 
always align with corporate interests, and it is for this reason that states 
sometimes grant tax holidays, stabilisation agreements, and subsidies, or 
provide supporting infrastructure to reduce these differences and make 
certain investments more attractive, allowing capital to accumulate in 
some areas and not others. The general point is that in the context of 
resource extraction we find that the state is thoroughly implicated, but 
it is also selectively present—at different times, and in different places, 
it will be more or less present and more or less aligned with the interests 
of different groups. Depending upon the vantage point, the state will 
cast a longer or shorter shadow and its presence or its absence will be felt 
in different ways.
Encountering the Absent Present State
For ease of navigation we have organised the chapters in this volume in 
terms of regional focus, connected via the two chapters concerned with gas 
extraction in PNG and Australia. The final chapter by John Burton and 
Claire Levacher introduces New Caledonia as a point of comparison to 
PNG and Australia. They explore whether the notion of ‘absent presence’ 
can be applied to a national context where the state is of a different kind 
to that in PNG and Australia, and most notably, as they argue, where 
it cannot absent itself. The volume concludes with a short afterword 
reflecting on the uncertainty of the state.
Between them, the contributing authors discuss cases of proposed mining 
ventures, existing large-scale mining operations and the extraction of 
natural gas (both coal seam gas and LNG). While these two national 
settings are distinctive in their own right, several interconnecting themes 
can be found, including particular types of engagement with the state, and 
specific experiences of the absence, the presence and the absent presence 
of the state in extractive contexts. Although these three phenomena are 
found in each, they have different weight in every chapter.
The most prominent theme running through the volume, and the most 
common way in which the absence of the state is manifest, is the failure 
of the state to fulfil its responsibilities (both stated and perceived). These 
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specific failures, silences and expressions of unreliability create a range of 
effects that evidence the presence of an absent state. Although the details 
of these effects differ between the cases, state effects are nevertheless 
present in all the chapters and constitute a second core interconnecting 
theme. These two themes speak to spatial and temporal dimensions of 
the absent presence of the state, and the materiality and morality of this 
absence—all of which are explored in the remainder of this introductory 
chapter, and in the chapters that follow.
Failure as Presence
In one way or another, each chapter speaks to the responsibilities 
of  the state in extractive contexts, and the state’s performance against 
those obligations. In democratic theory, the modern state legitimates 
itself through a simple bargain: citizens pay tax and agree to obey its 
laws, and in return, the state protects its people and keeps them safe. 
The inability of states to keep that pact in respect of resource extraction 
appears to be increasing, especially in Australia where commitment 
to the coal industry will exacerbate climate change and constitutes an 
existential threat to the security of the nation (Brett 2020). Among other 
things, state responsibilities encompass regulatory oversight of extractive 
processes; protection from human rights abuses and other forms of harm; 
the monitoring and management of the social and environmental risks 
and impacts of extraction; implementation of agreements and other 
commitments including the distribution of benefits to project area 
landowners, and the delivery of services and programs or the construction 
of public infrastructure; participation in governance processes surrounding 
resource extraction including involvement in forums, working groups and 
reporting initiatives; the general maintenance of ‘order’ in these extractive 
sites; and so on. These and others are intertwined and actively negotiated 
in the context of resource extraction.
While failures of the state can be taken as a demonstration of state absence 
or impotence, they can also be reconceptualised and experienced as a form 
of presence, what we term an absent presence. Such failure often informs 
experiences and engagement with the state, and these failures are often 
revealed through a series of state effects. Each of the contributing authors 
observes moments where the state is encountered through a series of lacks 
THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN LARGE-SCALE RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
26
and problems, unreliability, ineffectiveness or deception. These encounters 
are neither straightforward nor uniform, and paradoxically, these failures 
and absences often lead to an enhanced sense of state presence.
Locating the state in contemporary resource extraction contexts is not 
always a simple task. A number of contributors describe instances of 
what David Szablowski (2007) calls the ‘selective absence of the state’, 
or  what others in this volume have inversely termed a ‘selective’ or 
a ‘strategic presence’. For example, both Gareth Lewis and Sarah Holcombe 
explain how the legal environment in Australia’s Northern Territory allows 
companies to operate with minimum regulatory oversight. Lewis describes 
the systematic marginalisation of Aboriginal people around the McArthur 
River Mine and argues that, from a local Aboriginal perspective, the state 
has essentially absented itself from the project, failing to enforce existing 
legislation designed to protect the rights and interests of Aboriginal 
people. Holcombe uses a case study of a junior mining company seeking 
to operate on Aboriginal lands to show how the state has strategically acted 
to pursue extractive capitalism, and how the state has been significantly 
more present in its role as an enabler for the industry than a protector 
for local Aboriginal communities and environments. In a similar vein, 
Martin Espig describes a ‘partially absent’ state in the context of coal seam 
gas developments in western Queensland, where the rapid development of 
multiple gas projects outpaced the regulating departments of the state and 
pushed them beyond their capacity once developments fully commenced. 
These ‘runaway processes’ (Eriksen 2018) reveal the contradictions at the 
heart of contemporary extractive capitalism, and the double bind that 
encompasses the state, suspended between short-term growth imperatives 
and long-term goals of stability and sustainability.
When PNG gained independence from Australia, ‘many of the new state’s 
claims to legitimacy were based on the promise that all Papua New Guineans 
could expect development to come their way’ (Jorgensen 2007: 58). The 
inability to deliver upon this promise has seriously eroded the legitimacy 
of the state in the eyes of many citizens, which partly explains why so many 
rural communities hope that extractive companies might come along and 
fill this gap, and the willingness of the government to allow this to happen. 
In PNG and Australia, the state habitually reduces delivery of services 
around mining projects. As resource companies ‘have become increasingly 
involved in “community development” roles, often promoting the newly 
acquired corporate language of “sustainability” and “partnerships”’ (Banks 
2008: 24), this extended corporate role often results in the withdrawal 
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of the state from some of its functions and responsibilities,  in what is 
effectively a privatisation of state functions. For  instance, in the Lihir 
islands, Nicholas Bainton and Martha Macintyre have observed how the 
state has consistently failed to fulfil its commitments under the terms of 
the agreements that it has signed for the development and operation 
of  the gold mine. The gap created by absent state actors has produced 
a far more intense relationship between the community and the company 
characterised by ‘mutual incomprehension’ and antagonism, and a very 
high degree of local dependency (Bainton 2021). In the absence of the 
state, the community have ‘manoeuvred’ the company into the space 
ordinarily occupied by the state, forcing the company to provide social 
services and infrastructure that are the responsibility of the government.
Alex Golub’s historical anthropology of the Porgera mine reminds 
us that we cannot take collective actors like ‘the mine’, ‘the state’ or 
‘the  landowners’  for granted, and that an accurate account of history 
must also focus on networks of people who appear in different times 
and different situations as personating one or the other of these entities. 
From this vantage point, we can begin to really grasp the interpenetration 
between collective actors and how the absence or the presence of the state 
is experienced over time.
In her work on kinship and law, Marilyn Strathern theorised the differences 
between ‘categorical’ and ‘interpersonal’ relations, demonstrating that while 
these different relations animate each other, these types of relationships 
are not always present at the same time (Strathern 2005). In PNG, the 
state exercises a substantial categorical presence through its legislative 
and permitting powers, but this may not equate to a relationship. Emilia 
Skrzypek describes how the absence of an interpersonal relationship 
between community members and state actors at the Frieda River Project 
in the remote Sepik region led local landowners to feel like they could 
never really get to know the state. Instead, they invested their hopes and 
energy in the relationships they developed with company personnel, 
which they came to consider as more important, more consequential and 
more effective in pursuit of their development aspirations. Not enacted 
through relations, and not made visible through delivery of services, the 
state constitutes an ambiguous, uncertain and absent presence at Frieda 
River where local communities look to the company to fulfil what would 
traditionally be considered roles and responsibilities of the state, and to 
facilitate the missing relationship with state representatives. Across the 
mountain range, at the PNG LNG project, local landowners staged an 
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attack on project facilities in an attempt to use the company as a proxy 
to get the attention of the government and voice their anger over unpaid 
royalties and unfulfilled promises of development. Michael Main argues 
that their anger was really directed at the state and not the company, 
who they regarded as ‘a pawn in a larger game of corruption that was 
being played out by various levels of government and the judiciary’. Other 
chapters also speak to the lack of interaction between communities and 
state representatives and the effects of these non-existent relationships.
While the chapters by Skrzypek and Main describe instances where the 
state fails to assert effective presence, Jo-Anne Everingham and her co-
authors describe an instance where the state did assert a presence but failed 
to maintain it. Their chapter documents the changing presence of the state 
at the large Century zinc mine in the Gulf of Carpentaria in northern 
Queensland since the negotiation of the Gulf Communities Agreement 
began in 1992. Like many resource extraction projects in Australia, the 
Century Mine evidences the tensions between the state’s responsibilities 
to ensure economic development on the one hand, and the well-being 
of regional populations, especially Aboriginal communities, on the other 
hand. The negotiation of the Gulf Communities Agreement was the high 
point of the mine; it set out a development vision that aimed to reduce 
welfare dependency among Aboriginal people in the region. A range of 
state actors engaged intensively with Aboriginal groups at the outset of the 
project to help establish the various representative committees and bodies 
that would form the institutional framework of the agreement and play 
a central role in implementing its objectives. But as priorities changed 
within the Government of Queensland, combined with considerable 
turnover in government personnel during the operational years of the 
mine, the state’s actions were often at a remove from the region, important 
commitments were not fulfilled and local dependency upon the mine 
increased. The authors of this chapter argue that rather than seeing such 
resource contexts as ‘stateless spaces’, where the state plays a limited role, 
they can be understood as spaces where the state takes ‘action at a distance’ 
to pursue its ends indirectly, through the actions of others, in this case the 
mining company.
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State Effects
In mapping the effects and the presence of the state, anthropologists have 
generally looked for signs of administrative bureaucracies, regulation, 
service provision and other technologies of governance that support larger 
order-making agendas. Thinking of the state in terms of these order-
making functions leads us to consider those places where the state has 
been unable to impose its order. Golub’s historical account of law and 
order in Enga Province, provides a case in point. The presence of gold, 
and in later years the development of the Porgera mine, altered the history 
of policing in the Porgera valley, challenging the state’s monopoly over 
violence, and law and order. The understaffed and under-resourced police 
force contrasts with the company’s well-resourced private security force. 
However, as Golub explains, the picture is more complicated as many 
police officers were also members of the mine’s security team, and the 
latter often supplied resources to the former. As a result, law and order has 
gradually been recast in terms of ‘security’, as order is upheld by privately 
contracted security firms.
The limited presence of the state in those rural areas where mines are 
often located has turned these projects into new sites of ‘governmentality’, 
which can be defined as the ensemble of disciplining processes, 
institutions and tactics that attempt to shape human conduct—or how 
conduct is governed (Dean 1999). As companies are forced into closer 
contact with surrounding communities they often assume some of the 
responsibilities of the state including the provision of social services 
and infrastructure, development and implementation of programs, and 
greater levels of monitoring and self-regulation. In assuming some degree 
of responsibility for classic state functions, resource companies shape local 
desires and configure habits, aspirations and beliefs. They may act with 
a notional ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007) the local population, but they do so 
in ways that are rationally calculated towards the larger goals of extractive 
capitalism. In doing so, the actions of resource companies constitute these 
locales as authoritative and powerful, as different agents are assembled 
with specific powers, and particular domains—like lease land areas, group 
identification or the receipt of benefits—are constituted as governable and 
administrable (Dean 1999: 29). As sites of governmentality, extractive 
projects produce ‘extractive subjectivities’. This occurs by reworking forms 
of exclusion and inclusion in ways that serve the interests of extractive 
companies, by reshaping lifeworlds in areas targeted for investment, and 
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by transforming state–society–market relations, with companies assuming 
state‐like functions and subjecting them to capitalist logics (Fredricksen 
and Himley 2019: 59). This ultimately results in new ‘extractive subjects’ 
coming into being.
These new forms of governmentality often expose the shortcomings of 
the state, and the inability of companies to meet local expectations for 
development. In Australia, Espig describes instances where, let down 
by the state and increasingly distrustful of its ability to regulate and 
monitor the industry and associated risks, citizens stepped in and took 
it upon themselves to hold companies accountable for their actions. This 
is representative of a process addressed by several other authors in this 
volume, where the absence of the state incentivises people to deal directly 
with the company, facilitating new forms of relations, interdependencies 
and interactions. As the state retreats from certain spaces, companies 
and community members can become ‘responsiblised’ as they assume 
greater levels of responsibility for managing various health and social 
risks related to these developments. Drawing from the work of Ulrich 
Beck (2009: 193), Espig argues that these runaway developments have 
resulted in a situation where ‘no individual or institution seems to be 
held specifically accountable for anything’. This resonates with a point 
made elsewhere by Filer and his co-authors that in PNG, and from 
the perspective of the mining industry, the resource curse takes the 
form of a  ‘responsibility vacuum’, which makes partnerships with host 
governments and local communities ‘difficult, dangerous or downright 
impossible’ (2008: 175).
State effects also assume a material form. For example, the original 
agreements for the Lihir gold mine contained a commitment by the state 
and the company to build and maintain a road around the main island 
where the mine is located. After some 20  years of mining operations, 
the road remained unsealed. While the company eventually took steps 
to seal half of the road (fulfilling part of its original commitment), the 
state has not fulfilled its part. The materiality of the road, and indeed 
the mine itself and the various other pieces of public infrastructure that 
are promised as benefits of extraction, invokes the dynamic relationship 
between the presence and absence of the state. Penny Harvey makes 
a similar observation in her ethnography of roads in the Peruvian Andes. 
She engages the state ethnographically through the material ‘traces’ and 
‘effects’ which open out, rather than close down, further perspectives on 
the structures and practices through which specific modes of state power 
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are effected and reproduced (Harvey 2005: 131). Like the Andean roads, 
the local Lihir ring road produces numerous state effects. The road is 
a contested space. It has become the site of political struggle between the 
company and the state as they both shift the responsibility for completion. 
It is a point of conflict between the various levels of government who are 
signatories to the original agreement, and it is a source of acrimony as the 
community demand that the company fill the gap left by the state and 
the potholes left by its trucks. As ‘state effect’, the road provides a complex 
material site through which people experience and negotiate their 
relationships with power (ibid.: 134). Standing on the incomplete road, 
the state then appears in a multivalent form—as the object of people’s 
desire, and the source of bitterness and the feeling of abandonment.
A Multivalent Presence
Anthropologists often study states from the ‘margins’ (Das and Poole 
2004), or indirectly through the prism of nation and nationalism and 
related discourses (e.g. Herzfeld 1987; Handler 1988). Ethnographers 
tend to conduct much less fieldwork in the ‘halls of power’, where state 
political power is articulated and directly wielded.13 In a geographical 
sense, resource extraction sites are often peripheral places, distant from 
metropolitan centres where state power is concentrated, adding to 
the complex task of locating the state in extractive contexts. However, the 
processes of resource extraction occur both at the points of extraction as 
well as in major capital cities and industrial hubs, where companies are 
headquartered in close proximity to financial markets and the functions 
of the state that enable extractive capitalism. The various processes and 
effects of extraction also take place between these spaces, and beyond.
Many of the communities who reside around resource extraction projects, 
or who desire or fear them, inhabit ‘marginal spaces’ characterised by an 
absence of roads, schools, hospitals and other services that are signs of the 
presence of the state. Thus, the geographical distance often translates into 
physical and moral absence of the state and can be used to contextualise 
specific kinds of state behaviour, such as the withdrawal of government 
functions. As the contributing authors show, the state as a macro-actor 
is rarely held responsible for its promises and commitments in extractive 
contexts, which is partly due to the combination of physical distance and 
13  Exceptions from the region include Santos da Costa (2018).
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ideas that circulate about the ‘natural’ marginality of these places and the 
people who inhabit them, especially Indigenous people. This also reinforces 
the value of thinking about the nature of the state as a conglomerate of 
actors and institutions, rather than a collective actor. Skrzypek recalls 
a government representative explicitly telling community members at 
the Frieda River Project: ‘Before, you all lived in the bush and you had 
nothing. The government is too far away, it will not help you. If it was not 
for the company you would still be in the bush with no development, 
nothing. If you don’t support the company, you will go back’.
The geographic distance between centres of national and regional 
governance and the often-remote sites of extraction means that 
communities in those locations find themselves subjected to decisions and 
policies made away from local contexts. Lewis describes the experience 
of those communities affected by the McArthur River Mine who live 
a long way from centres of state power. ‘Absent decision makers’ have long 
‘wielded power from afar’, which has contributed to their experience of 
the state as a distant and disinterested institution on the one hand, and 
as a powerful and malevolent presence on the other hand. He adds the 
neoliberal state to a long list of ‘broken promise men’ who have altered 
the course of the mining project and Aboriginal people’s lives over time. 
An even more extreme case of wielding power from afar is described by 
Burton and Levacher in the context of New Caledonia where the industry 
was directly impacted by events and policy changes decided in France, 
literally halfway around the world. The task of locating the state in resource 
extraction contexts gets even more complicated if we consider other kinds 
of peripheralities at play, particularly those associated with asymmetries 
of power, representation and decision making experienced by Indigenous 
people. Taking stock of legislative systems, procedures and effects, both 
Lewis and Holcombe locate Australia’s Aboriginal communities on a kind 
of political periphery, drawing links between geographic remoteness and 
a history of violence and political and socioeconomic peripheralisation 
which combine to push Aboriginal communities to marginalised and 
compromised positions vis-à-vis the state and multinational corporations.
The temporal dimensions of absent presence also emerge across the 
chapters. Writing about the temporality of the government in PNG, 
Dalsgaard (2013) describes how the state is made present in time, for 
example through rhythms, schedules and engagements. In both national 
contexts discussed here, the state as a regulator influences temporalities of 
resource extraction projects and is present in time through, for example, 
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specific initiatives and interventions (as discussed by Golub), negotiated 
agreements (as illustrated by Everingham et al. and Bainton and 
Macintyre); and changes in the regulatory and governance environment, 
including those related to the critical question of national sovereignty, 
within which the industry operates (Burton and Levacher). The presence 
of the state in time can also be experienced through its failure to be present 
at a time when this presence is expected. For example by delaying the 
distribution of royalties to affected communities (as discussed by Main), 
or where sluggish state processes are outpaced by a fast-moving industry, 
increasing potentially risky gaps in industry permitting and oversight 
(as elaborated by Espig).
While these examples show how the state can be made present in time, it is 
also present (or absent) over time. Most of the chapters in this volume take 
a broader historical view to show how the state was present (and absent) 
prior to extraction, and how and if this changed, or remained the same, 
in the context of extraction. Thus the presence and the absence of the 
state should be considered across the entire mine life cycle. For example, 
Everingham and her co-authors also trace the government’s receding 
involvement over time at the Century Mine. And at the contentious PNG 
LNG project, Main locates experiences of the state in a local ontology that 
interprets the state’s action and inaction in terms of ancestral prophecies of 
abundance and a historical trajectory of decline. The spatial and temporal 
configuration and experience of such encounters with the state, and its 
arbitrary exercise of power, can also be thought of as maps of frustration 
or horizons of disillusioned expectations. These are spaces where the legal 
claims and commitments of the state—and the assurances of the state—
become unsettled by the practices of state representatives and government 
departments and their emissaries. Where state-systems and the actions of 
its representatives and agencies fail to dissolve the tension, people may 
take it upon themselves to address the dissonance.
Lewis provides one of the most ‘colourful’ examples of local protest over 
the failure of the government to make itself present in meaningful ways. 
In order to voice their opposition to the McArthur River Mine and 
gain support for their cause, community members launched an emotive 
exhibition of photographs and artwork in Darwin. The exhibition drew 
attention to the intrinsic cultural and spiritual value of their land, seemingly 
disregarded by the state in its ardent support for the mine. Their artwork 
stood as a moral critique of the state’s absence, or its uneven presence, and 
the effects of state sponsored extractive capitalism. In a similar vein, Main 
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shows how Huli landowners attempted to hold the government responsible 
for unfulfilled promises of benefits and development at the PNG LNG 
project. He argues that local landowners have interpreted a range of events 
and processes, including natural phenomena such as a recent devastating 
earthquake, as a direct effect of what they regard as the ‘immoral absence 
of the state’. He writes that Huli people saw the immorality of the state 
as a ‘material threat to the future aspirations of Huli’ and their prophetic 
entitlement to benefit from their resources.
Conclusion
In this introductory chapter we have claimed that resource extraction 
provides a useful starting point for studying the state and its effects. 
To paraphrase Clifford Geertz (1973: 22) who once argued that 
anthropologists don’t simply study villages, ‘they study in villages’, 
anthropologists do well to not only study resource projects, but can also 
study the state from the particular vantage point of resource extraction. 
The ethnographic examples from PNG and Australia offered here 
illustrate the illegibility and obscurity of the state. From the perspective 
of these resource extraction sites, the state is often barely perceptible. It is 
bamboozling, deceptive, dangerous and two-faced, self-interested and 
sometimes completely unknowable. Material and ideological aspects of 
the state are mutually reinforcing in these resource domains, where the 
state looms as an eternally incomplete and uncertain project having to 
constantly reproduce itself.
The chapters in this volume show that although states might be imagined, 
or contested, they have real effects in people’s lives, especially in the 
settings described here. Where gaps emerge as a result of the failure of 
the state to enact its responsibilities or, to paraphrase Skrzypek, where 
dissonance appears in the networks which inevitably emerge around 
resource extraction projects, something or someone will either choose or 
be persuaded to fill this space. An anthropology of absent presence which 
we propose here offers a unique perspective on the state in relation to 
resource extraction. Not just because it captures the gaps and unruliness 
that is thought to reside in resource frontier zones, but because it suggests 
that incompleteness, partial presence, and frustrated forms of order-
making are a necessary entailment of the state and the way it is experienced 
and encountered in the context of resource extraction.
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